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Abstract: This paper considers the extent to which international human rights law offers protection to 
‘climate migrants’ irrespective of whether these persons would qualify for refugee status. In contrast with 
most existing literature, it does not focus on States’ obligations arising from the right to life or the prohibition 
of inhumane treatment. Instead, the paper focuses on the right of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy 
their culture as protected under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
paper peruses the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of Article 27, with particular attention to its link 
with the rights of peoples to self-determination and to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources as 
protected under Article 1 of the Covenant. Based on this analysis the paper challenges the presupposition 
that a normative gap exists, pointing instead at a need for further research into the interpretation of norms 
and obstacles to enforcement.
*
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On 26 November 2013 the High Court in Auckland handed down judgement in the case of Ione 
Teitiota, 37, who had been characterised in the media as the ‘world’s first climate change 
refugee’.1  Mr Teitiota had claimed protection in New Zealand under the 1967 Protocol to the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘the Refugee Convention’),2 based on adverse 
effects of climate change on his home and livelihood in Kiribati.3 The case was an appeal from a 
decision of the New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’), which in turn 
appealed the decision of a protection officer to decline Mr Teitiota’s request for refugee status. 
The Tribunal found that Mr Teitiota was neither a refugee nor a protected person and therefore 
not entitled to protection.4 He was not a refugee because the effects of environmental 
degradation on Kiribati and on the claimant’s standard of living did not amount to ‘persecution’ 
within the terms of the Refugee Convention. There was no evidence establishing that the 
environmental conditions that Mr Teitiota faced or was likely to face on return were so parlous 
that his life would be placed in jeopardy, or that he and his family would not be able to resume 
their prior subsistence life with dignity.5 The Tribunal further relied on the considerations that the 
effects of environmental degradation, although proven on the facts, were faced by the population 
generally and ‘[favoured] to civil or political status’ and that the government of Kiribati could not 
be said to have failed to protect Mr Teitiota from such effects.6 Neither did Mr Teitiota fall within 
the scope of domestic legislation that gave effect to provisions of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),7 which extends protection under the Refugee Convention to 
                                                  
*
 A version of this paper was presented at the CGHR Research Group in November 2012 and discussed during a 
Networking Workshop of Working Group II of the COST Action IS 1101 ‘Climate Change and Migration: Knowledge, Law 
and Policy and Theory’ at Utrecht University, the Netherlands in September 2012. I am grateful to the discussant at 
CGHR, Dr. Jessie Hohmann, for her invaluable comments and feedback, to Phil Chan for his useful comments and to the 
audiences in Utrecht and Cambridge for engaging and thought-provoking questions. I also thank my doctoral 
supervisors, Professor Martin Scheinin and Dr. Markus Gehring, for their support throughout my doctoral research 
project. 
1
 ‘Kiribati Climate Change Refugee Rejected by New Zealand’ The Telegraph (London, 26 November 2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/kiribati/10474602/Kiribati-climate-change-
refugee-rejected-by-New-Zealand.html> accessed 26 November 2013.  
2
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 
(Refugee Convention) and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 
October 1967) 606 UNTS 267 (Protocol to the Refugee Convention).  
3
 Ioane Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2013] NZHC 3125 (judgement 
of 26 November 2013).  
4
 AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413.  
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 
999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).  
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persons who would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life or cruel 
treatment if deported from New Zealand. The Tribunal held that there was ‘no evidence that any 
act or omission of the Kiribati government pointed to any risk that the applicant would be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life under Article 6 and thus there were ‘no “substantial grounds” for 
believing the applicant or his family would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation 
of life’.8 
 
On appeal, the primary submission made on behalf of the applicant was, head-on, that the 
tribunal erred in law by failing to recognise that a person whose way of life is seriously impaired by 
warfare or climate change should be entitled to the protection of the Refugee Convention.9 
Further, it specifically erred in finding that because all people in Kiribati suffer from the same 
results of ‘global warming’ this disqualified Mr Teitiota from claiming refugee status.10 The High 
Court rejected these and a number of other claims, instead upholding the decision of the Tribunal 
with approval. It held that the applicant, by returning to Kiribati, ‘would not suffer a sustained and 
systematic violation of his basic human rights such as the right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR 
or the right to adequate food, clothing, and housing under Article 11 of the ICESCR’; that his 
position did not ‘appear to be different from that of any other Kiribati national’ and, finally, that 
there was ‘certainly […] no persecution or serious harm which [would] be visited on him for any of 
the five stipulated convention grounds’.11 It ended with the conclusion, framed in rather defensive 
terms, that the ‘attempt to expand dramatically the scope of the Refugee Convention […] is 
impermissible’.12 
 
It is important to note that the legal representatives of the claimant did not challenge the 
Tribunal’s implicit finding that protection under the ICCPR was conditional on life-threatening acts 
and omissions of the Kiribati government. Thus, they did not press the point that international 
human rights protection is not necessarily conditional on a person’s status under international 
refugee law. This enabled the High Court to decide the case based on a narrow construction of the 
Refugee Convention and implementing domestic legislation and to refrain from considering 
legally, politically and ethically controversial questions about the scope of human rights 
protection.  
 
The legal analysis in this paper will demonstrate that the invocation of provisions of international 
human rights law to Mr Teitiota’s case could have led to an entirely different line of reasoning, and 
perhaps a different outcome of the litigation. Notably, the paper focuses not on Article 6 of the 
ICCPR (to which reference was made in the High Court’s decision) but instead of Article 27, which 
protects the right of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their culture. As the paper will set 
out, the right to enjoy one’s own culture is particularly relevant to inhabitants of small island 
States are at the forefront of present and impending climatic changes.13 The enjoyment of the 
right might be affected as a result of the adverse effects on climate change on fragile ecosystems 
that form an intrinsic part of inhabitants’ culture and livelihoods.14 This vulnerability comes with a 
risk that cultural heritage, often developed over generations in close connection with a particular 
natural environment, will be damaged or lost,15 thus bringing the situation potentially within the 
scope of international human rights law.  
                                                  
8
 AF (Kiribati) at 92.  
9
 Ioane Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, para. 46. 
10
 Ibid para 40.  
11
 Ibid para 40. 
12
 Ibid para 63. 
13
 See, for example, J. Salick, ‘Traditional Peoples and Climate Change’ (2009) 19 Global Environmental Change 137.  
14
 Ibid at 138.  
15
 Ibid.  
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In examining the relevance of cultural rights to the situation of climate migrants, the paper 
peruses the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC)’s interpretation of Article 27. Through 
a discussion of the HRC’s interpretative practice, attention is drawn to its link with the rights of 
peoples to self-determination and to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources as 
protected under Article 1 of the ICCPR.16 On the basis of Article 27, the paper sketches out a legal 
framework that could potentially be relied upon on behalf of individuals or peoples who are forced 
to move as a result of climate change and who are seeking to protect their traditional culture. 
More broadly, it explores how international law may provide protection of a peoples’ enjoyment 
of their cultures in scenarios of climate-induced migration. For the purpose of this paper, ‘climate-
induced migration’ is understood as movement of people across borders as a direct or indirect 
result of the negative effects of climate change on their habitats. ‘Climate migrants’ are the 
subjects of such movement.  
 
 
2. The Right to Enjoy Culture in International Law 
 
The ICCPR is one of the most widely ratified international human rights treaties, with its 167 State 
parties including all States listed in Annex I to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC)17 and dozens of States located in areas where climate change is 
projected to have serious negative impacts on human life and livelihoods.18 Similar provisions that 
are not specifically aimed at the protection of minorities are contained in other human rights 
treaties.19 Article 27 reads as follows:  
                                                  
16
 Article 1 provides:  
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any 
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-
Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall 
respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
17
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 19 June 1993) 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (UNFCCC). 
18
 For ratification status, see http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last accessed 30 August 
2012).  Notably, some academics have argued that the entire collection of substantive obligations contained in the ICCPR 
has gradually become binding on all States as customary international law. See, for example, Theodor Meron, Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Clarendon Press 1989) 80-81.  
19
 Expressions of cultural rights are also found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) (Article 15); Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC) (Article 29); 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 
21 ILM 58 (Banjul Charter) (Article 22); the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted 11 July 1990, 
entered into force 29 November 1999) (1990) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (Article 21); the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (adopted 7 December 2000, entered into force 1 December 2009) reprinted in Official 
Journal of the European Communities, 18 December 2000 (OJ C 364/01) (Article 22); the American Convention on 
Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123(Article 26); the Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 17 
November 1988, entered into force 16 November 1999) OAS Treaty Series No 69 (1988) reprinted in Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEA/Ser L V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 67 (1992) (Protocol of San 
Salvador) (Article 14) and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families (adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 2220 UNTS 3 (Articles 17, 26, 31, 
64, 65). The latter treaty is particularly important in the context of the present paper; however, the number of States 
that has ratified the Convention is still low. For a discussion, see Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, ‘Migration, 
Human Rights and the United Nations: an Investigation into the Obstacles to the UN Convention on Migrant Workers' 
Rights’ 24 Windsor Yearbook on Access to Justice 241 and Beth Lyon, ‘The Unsigned United Nations Migrant Worker 
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In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, we must first establish if and when the beneficiaries of the right 
include actual or potential ‘climate migrants’ who are seeking protection of the right to enjoy a 
traditional culture. The answer would depend on one’s interpretation of the term ‘minorities’, as 
well as the nature of States’ legal obligations under this article. With regard to the term 
‘minorities’, Manfred Nowak notes that its meaning partly overlaps with the term ‘peoples’ in 
Article 1 of the Covenant.20 Nonetheless—as the Grand Captain of the Mikmaq Indians pointed out 
in a complaint to the HRC on behalf of the Mikmaq Indians against Canada—the two terms are to 
be distinguished.21 An independent definition of ‘minorities’ is also desirable to avoid a situation 
where State parties to the Covenant might be able to circumvent legal obligations to protect the 
right on the basis of an overly narrow interpretation of the term.  
 
In both theory and practice, there are four requirements understood to be implied by the term 
‘minorities’, namely: (1) numerical inferiority to the rest of the population; (2) being in a non-
dominant position; (3) having ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics that are distinct from 
those of the overall population of the State; and (4) showing, explicitly or implicitly, a sense of 
solidarity.22 Importantly, the term has been interpreted as including aliens; in other words, the 
term ‘minorities’ does not relate to nationals of a State only.23 The HRC has gone as far as to state 
that just as beneficiaries of the right ‘need not be nationals or citizens, they need not be 
permanent residents’ and thus may include ‘migrant workers or even visitors’.24 Nowak also 
opines that the rights enjoyed by minorities ‘should not be denied to immigrants, including 
migrant workers, who entered the country only recently’.25 These interpretations indicate that the 
right is a human right rather than a right of citizens.26 It could accordingly be argued that any 
group of climate migrants that meets the definition of ‘minorities’ is entitled to protection of their 
right under Article 27 in a host State, regardless of their legal status or citizenship. 
 
As Nowak points out, the right in Article 27 was purposefully formulated as an individual right, but 
with the phrase ‘in community with the other members of their group’ inserted in order to 
preserve the idea of a group.27 As a result, the right is best understood as an individual right 
containing a collective element.28 James Anaya, who currently holds the mandate of the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, has pointed out that Article 27 in 
practice protects both group and individual interests in cultural integrity.29  Because of its 
                                                                                                                                         
Rights Convention: an Overlooked Opportunity to Change the "Brown Collar" Migration Paradigm’ 42 International Law 
and Politics 391.   
20
 Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Second edn, N.P. Engel Publisher 
2004) 643. 
21
 Mikmaq Tribal Society v Canada Communication No 78/1980 para. 7.3.  
22
 F. Capotorti, Study by the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities on the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1997) at 96.  
23
 Nowak 645. Cf. Capotorti, n. 22, at 12. 
24
 See General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27) adopted on 8 April 1994, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add5 HRC para. 5.2. 
25
 Nowak 647.  
26
 Ibid 646. 
27
 Ibid 655. 
28
 See also General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27) para. 16. 
29
 S. James Anaya, ‘International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: the Move Toward the Multicultural State’ (2004) 
21 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 13, 22.  
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individual dimension the right to enjoy one’s own culture is cognizable under the Optional 
Protocol, which means that individuals may use the individual complain procedure established 
under this protocol in cases of alleged violations of their Article 27 rights by State parties.30 As the 
HRC has considered that self-determination is not a right cognizable under the Protocol, Article 27 
has in some cases provided an indirect way to invoke the provisions of Article 1. 
 
The HRC has taken the view that indigenous communities may constitute a minority group within 
the meaning of the article.31 It has upheld this view in several complaints submitted by 
representatives of indigenous peoples, which together make up most of the findings of the 
Committee under Article 27.32 Most notable in this regard is the Committee’s decision in Lubicon 
Lake Band v Canada,33 where it decided to deal with a complaint about an alleged violation of the 
right of self-determination of a people under Article 27 instead of under Article 1. It held that 
‘historical inequities and certain more recent developments’ threatened the way of life and 
culture of the Lubicon Lake Band, and constituted a violation of Article 27.34 As will be elaborated 
below, this case, as well as further caselaw under Article 27, suggests a strong link between 
Articles 1 and 27; a link which is, as we will see, of practical significance for actual or potential 
climate migrants seeking protection of their right to enjoy their culture. From a doctrinal 
perspective, an important implication of this link is that the reasoning of the HRC in Article 27 
cases is instructive for understanding how peoples’ rights are protected under international law, 
irrespective of whether a people constitutes a minority within the meaning of Article 27.  
 
 
3. Cultural Rights, the Right of Self-Determination and Climate Change 
 
Most of the HRC’s views under Article 27 concern complaints submitted to the HRC by members of 
indigenous peoples. One of the first cases was Diergaardt et al v Namibia,35 where the petitioning 
members of the Rehoboth Basters, an ethnic minority within Namibia, claimed violations of 
Articles 25 (the right to public participation) and 1 (the right of self-determination) due to the 
ending of the 124-year long existence of Rehoboth as a continuously organised territory as a result 
of the emergence of Namibia as an independent State.36 In addition, the authors claimed a 
violation of Article 27 on the basis that their communal land was expropriated.  Although it did not 
find a violation of either provision, the HRC recognized that ‘the provisions of article 1 may be 
relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected by the Covenant, in particular articles 25, 
26 and 27’.37 In relation to Article 27, the HRC explicitly stated that no violation could be found due 
to the Rhoboth Basters’ failure to demonstrate a relationship between the land covered by their 
claim and a distinct culture.  
 
The relationship between land and culture is of great significance in the context of climate-induced 
migration and potential claims under Article 27. In the literature, this relationship has been 
explored in detail in relation to low-lying island States where it is reflected in many indigenous 
languages: for example, in Cook Islands Maori, ‘enua’ means ‘land, country, territory, afterbirth’; 
in Futuna (Wallace) ‘fanua’ means ‘country, land, the people of a place’; and in Tonga, ‘fonua’ 
                                                  
30
 General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27) para. 3.1.  
31
 Ibid para. 3.2. 
32
 For an analysis of this jurisprudence see Martin Scheinin, ‘The Right to Enjoy a Distinct Culture: Indigenous and 
Competing Uses of Land’ in T.S. Orlin, A. Rosas and M. Scheinin (eds), The Jurisprudence of Human Rights Law: A 
Comparative Interpretive Approach (Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights 2000) 163 ff. 
33
 Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (Communication No 167/1984). 
34
 Ibid para. 33. 
35
 J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia (Communication No 760/1997).  
36
 Ibid paras 3.1-3.2.   
37
 Ibid. para 10.3.  
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means ‘island, territory, estate, the people of the estate, placenta’ and ‘fonualoto’, ‘grave’.38 As 
Kalaveti Batibasaqa and others point out, in several Polynesian languages ‘pro-fanua is both the 
people and the territory that nourishes them, as a placenta nourishes a baby’.39 However, the 
simplistic idea that indigenous peoples are necessarily physically bonded to their location should 
be avoided. In this regard, John Campbell refers to the narrative of an inhabitant of a village in 
north-eastern Papua New Guinea named Tabara, which has a ‘history of fusion, division and travel’ 
extending over 130 kilometres in distance.40 This suggests that certain types of migration occur 
without substantive loss of, or even as part of, indigenous cultures. At the same time, as Campbell 
points out, many migrants continue to feel a connection with their land, even after having resided 
elsewhere for considerable periods of time.41 This implies that despite the fact that migration and 
mobility are sometimes inherent in indigenous cultures, the loss of indigenous peoples’ land that is 
projected to occur as a result of climate change is still likely to interfere with their cultural identity 
and associated human rights.  
 
Often classified as a ‘slow-onset disaster’, the projected inundation of low-lying small islands will 
inevitably trigger individuals and communities to relocate within or outside the territory of their 
States of origin.42 The possible disappearance of these States’ territories raises complex questions 
related to statehood, citizenship and the right of self-determination of affected peoples, as well as 
to cultural identity. The relationship with Article 1 is particularly significant in this context. Small 
island States that are threatened with inundation have underlined this significance in multilateral 
discussions. For example, the Maldives has stated in a submission to the United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) that ‘[t]he permanent loss of statehood, 
without a successor State to take its place, violates a people’s right to self-determination’.43 The 
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) has highlighted that the threat of physical disappearance or 
disuse of a State’s territory is without precedent, and that climate change poses a real and 
complex threat to nationhood. 44 It has indicated that it does not believe that migration could be a 
solution that is fully in accordance with the right to self-determination: 
 
the potential enforcement of an assertion that a low-lying, remote developing island nation can 
simply “adapt” to the physical loss of its homeland and nationhood by removing the population to a 
foreign nation is, perhaps, itself a violation of the fundamental human right to nationhood. Due to 
natural geography, there are few – if any – alternatives for relocating within RMI, and/or within 
atolls. The reclassification of Marshallese as a displaced nation or, loosely defined, as “climate 
refugees,” is not only undesirable, but also unacceptable as an affront to self-determination and 
national dignity.
45 
 
                                                  
38
 Kalaveti Batibasaqa, John Overton and Peter Horsley, ‘Vanua: Land, People and Culture in Fiji’ in John Overton and 
Regina Schreyvens (eds), Strategies for Sustainable Development: Experiences from the Pacific (Zed Books 1990) 100 
(referring to Pond, W., ‘The Land with All Woods and Water’, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, Waitangi 
Tribunal, Wellington (1997) 32).  
39
 Ibid.  
40
 J. Campbell, ‘Climate-Induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The Meaning and Importance of Land’ in Jane 
McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2010) 62 (citing J.D. 
Waiko, ‘Na Minandere, Imo Averi? We Are Binandere, Who Are You?’ 26 Pacific Viewpoint, 9).  
41
 Campbell 63.  
42
 Walter Kalin and Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change: Normative 
Gaps and Possible Approaches (UNHCR Division of International Protection, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series 
PPLA/2012/01, 2012).  
43 
Ibid 40.  
44
 Republic of the Marshall Islands, National Communication regarding the Relationship Between Human Rights & The 
Impacts of Climate Change, Submitted by H.E. Mr. Phillip H. Muller to United Nations Human Rights Council on 31 
December 2008 (2008) 10. 
45 
Ibid.  
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In the same context, some legal writers have pointed at the intimate relationship between 
indigenous peoples and their natural environments. This relationship has led Sara Aminzadeh to 
state that ‘[e]xercising the right of self-determination and protecting the ecosystem from climate 
change are […] one and the same’.46 Along similar lines, Tiffany Duong has contended, citing the 
example of Tuvalu, that ‘[w]hen the ocean drowns Tuvalu, the loss of sovereignty and 
statelessness caused by climate change will violate Tuvalu’s rights of self-determination’.47  She 
points out that when Tuvaluan people are forced to leave their homelands, they would no longer 
be a able to raise their children as they wish, while living in harmony with land and sea and thus 
maintaining their unique history, geography and culture.48 The OHCHR seemed to follow this 
rationale in its study, where it suggested that the right of self-determination could potentially be 
negated as a result of the impacts of climate change.49 
 
   
4. Positive Obligations to Ensure the Right to Enjoy Culture 
 
In light of the above, what are the legal obligations of States towards members of minorities who 
migrate as a result of climate change? To answer this question, it is important to understand the 
nature of legal obligations under this provision, particularly whether these include ‘positive’ 
obligations to take measures to ensure the right. This is important because climate change as such 
is caused primarily by greenhouse gas emissions emitted through the acts of private persons, and 
thus establishing a legal link between climate change-induced migration and greenhouse gas 
emissions often requires an understanding of what a State failed to do to reduce these emissions. 
Positive obligations might also reverse the burden of proof in human rights litigation, thus 
providing alleged victims of climate change with the avenue of arguing that a respondent State 
must prove compliance with its obligations to protect them. One consequence could be that 
victims are able to claim reparations even if the cause of the damage is uncertain.50  
 
Based merely on the text of Article 27, it would seem reasonable to argue that the provision does 
not impose positive obligations on States on the basis that it is negatively formulated. Indeed, 
Article 27 is the only provision in the Covenant that is formulated in negative terms. The HRC has 
nonetheless found that the provision does create positive obligations, based on a systematic 
examination of the terms in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the ICCPR.51 
As there is nothing in the provision to the contrary, a systematic interpretation of the Covenant 
requires that the provision be interpreted in accordance with Article 2 of the Covenant which sets 
out an obligation of States ‘to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant’.52 As Nowak explains, the 
obligation to respect these rights ‘means that States Parties must refrain from restricting the 
                                                  
46 
Sara C. Aminzadeh, ‘A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights Implications of Climate Change’ (2006) 30 Hastings 
International & Comparative Law Review 231 255-6. 
47 
T. T. V. Duong, ‘When Islands Drown: The Plight of "Climate Change Refugees" and Recourse to International Human 
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exercise of these rights where such is not expressly allowed’.53 In its General Comment No. 31 on 
the Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, the 
Committee elaborated on this obligation, stating that ‘any restrictions on any of the [Covenant 
rights] must be permissible under the relevant provisions of the Covenant’.54 It added that ‘[i]n no 
case may the restrictions be applied or invoked in a manner that would impair the essence of a 
Covenant right’.55  
 
The HRC has noted that the positive obligations of States will only be fully discharged if States 
protect individuals against violations by its agents as well as by private persons over which it has 
jurisdiction.56 It points out that: 
 
There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 
would give rise to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting 
or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate 
or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.
57
  
 
The positive obligations of States under the Covenant include an obligation, spelled out in Article 
2(2), to take the necessary steps to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant.58 The Committee has stated that this 
requirement ‘is unqualified and of immediate effect’.59  
 
The HRC’s position that Article 27 creates positive obligations flows directly from this rationale. 
Accordingly, it stated in General Comment 23 that ‘[p]ositive measures of protection are… 
required not only against the acts of the State party itself, whether through its legislative, judicial 
or administrative authorities, but also against the acts of other persons within the State party’.60 
This interpretation is in accordance with the object and purpose of the ICCPR in general and Article 
27 in particular: as Nowak points out,  
 
the … purpose of a specific provision on the protection of minorities in the Covenant is to set down 
some sort of privileged treatment for minorities in order to achieve real equality. This cannot be 
achieved by mere State obligations of non-interference, since experience shows that minorities, 
and indigenous peoples in particular, are not only threatened by government action but equally by 
other, more dominant, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, by businesses and similarly powerful 
private actors.
61
  
 
Such obligations are important in the case of migrants who come from a distinct culture and must 
flee from the impacts of climate change, and who may be met with hostility and xenophobia by 
other groups in a third State. In a broad sense, positive obligations under Article 27 might be also 
be construed as giving rise to prevention obligations, perhaps requiring affirmative action to the 
benefit of minorities whose cultures are at risk of extinction due to climate change. In light of 
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Articles 1, 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations,62 the provision might specifically require 
States to cooperate so as to prevent irreversible loss of intangible cultural heritage that would 
deprive minorities or peoples of their rights. The interpretative challenge lies in determining what 
this would mean for individual States, including States that might be confronted with requests for 
protection by climate migrants, whose rights might already have been affected by the adverse 
effects of climate change. 
 
 
5. State Responsibility for Violations of the Right to Enjoy Culture 
 
The HRC offered important clarification of what could amount to a breach of States’ obligations in 
a series of cases against Finland brought by members of the indigenous Sami people. These cases 
all concerned alleged interferences with Sami people’s traditional reindeer herding culture.63 In 
Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland,64 the HRC decided that the impact of stone quarrying permitted 
by the Finnish authorities was not so ‘substantial’ as to amount to a violation of Article 27 because 
the extent of quarrying did not constitute a denial of the petitioners’ right to enjoy their own 
culture.65 The HRC went on to state that under Article 27 measures must be taken to ensure the 
effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions affecting them, noting 
that the interests of the petitioners were considered during the decision-making process. 66 A 
similar situation arose in Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland,67 and in applying what Martin Scheinin 
has described as its ‘combined test of participation by the group and sustainability of the 
indigenous economy’68 the HRC was again unable to find a violation of Article 27.69 
 
In Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand,70 the HRC further fine-tuned this test. The case 
concerned a settlement between New Zealand and Maoris that would regulate all Maori fishing 
rights and interests. The complainants had not been part of an extensive process of negotiations 
on the settlement.71 However, the facts demonstrated that New Zealand had engaged itself in a 
process of broad consultation before proceeding to legislate while paying specific attention to the 
sustainability of Maori fishing activities. The HRC held that the State Party’s extensive consultation 
with Maori representatives and its specific attention to the sustainability of Maori fishing activities 
amounted to compliance with Article 27.72 The Committee reiterated that ‘the acceptability of 
measures that affect or interfere with the culturally significant economic activities of a minority 
depends on whether the members of the minority in question have had the opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process in relation to these measures and whether they will 
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continue to benefit from their traditional economy’.73 In doing so, it made an important 
pronouncement on the margin of appreciation:  
  
A State may understandably wish to encourage development or allow economic activity by 
enterprises. The scope of its freedom to do so is not to be assessed by reference to a margin of 
appreciation, but by reference to the obligations it has undertaken under article 27. Article 27 
requires that a member of a minority shall not be denied his right to enjoy his own culture. Thus, 
measures whose impact amount to a denial of the right will not be compatible with the obligations 
under article 27.
74
 
 
This interpretation is indicative of a minimum level of protection guaranteed under Article 27, 
which might be understood as the ‘core’ of the right which must be protected at all times.75 It 
could be deduced that States are obliged to address the threat posed by climate change to the 
traditional cultures of indigenous people and other cultural minorities in order to avoid denial of 
the right. It is clear from the jurisprudence of the HRC and other bodies that these obligations are 
positive and negative, thus presumably overlapping in part with the obligations under the rights to 
life, health and self-determination. In other words, all these rights could be construed as imposing 
obligations on States to take legislative and other measures to achieve standards of protection 
that are required under each of these rights. The participation dimension of the right under Article 
27 could be construed in conjunction with Article 1 of the Covenant, pointing towards an 
obligation to ensure that affected people are able to participate in decision-making on climate 
change at all levels. 
 
 
6. Territorial Boundaries or Causation as a Shield against State Responsibility? 
 
An outstanding question in the interpretation of States’ obligations is the territorial scope of 
obligations. Much scholarship has been devoted to the broader question of whether States’ 
obligations under the ICCPR extends towards individuals outside a State’s territory, with several 
scholars relying on the HRC’s statement in Lopez v Uruguay that a State should not be allowed ‘to 
perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another state, which violations it could 
not perpetrate on its own territory’76 to argue that the obligations of State parties do extend to 
persons outside their territories.77 The HRC itself has offered some clarification: it first stated in its 
General Comment No. 31 that States owe obligations ‘to anyone within the power or effective 
control of the State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party’,78 and then 
apparently changed its approach to one that considers whether a State has control over a 
situation that interferes with Covenant rights, rather than over individuals whose rights are 
affected.79 
 
In the context of climate change, an argument could accordingly be made that by virtue of Articles 
27 and 1, States with control over activities that cause climate change incur positive obligations to 
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protect the culturally significant economic activities of certain minorities. This would then include 
an obligation to take measures that provide members of these minorities with the opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process in relation to the activities that could affect their rights. 
Measures that deprive cultural minorities or peoples from the ability to benefit from their 
traditional economy are seemingly prohibited in any event. Insofar as climate change-induced 
migration is symptomatic of the denial of this ability, one or several States might be under an 
obligation to provide an adequate and effective remedy to climate migrants as a result of their 
involvement in the causes of climate change (and thus irrespective of their obligations under 
international refugee law). These conclusions trigger questions about the extent to which States’ 
acts or omissions that contribute to climate change can be meaningfully linked with the 
interferences with climate migrants’ cultural rights if these interferences triggered the migration.   
 
Although anecdotal and scientific evidence would need to be considered on a case-by-case basis, it 
is instructive to note here that climate change-induced migration can be legally understood as a 
foreseeable consequence of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) first observed in 1990 that ‘[m]igration and resettlement may be the most threatening 
short-term effects of  climate change on human settlements’ and more generally that the gravest 
effects of climate change may be those on human migration.80 This recognition of the impact of 
climate change on human migration has triggered a considerable body of scholarship, including, as 
Jane McAdam notes, alarmist and non-empirically grounded assumptions about the extent and 
nature of such migration.81 However, the assumption that climate change—in combination with 
multiple other ‘stressors’—triggers large-scale human migration is virtually undisputed. As 
McAdam puts it, climate change ‘tends to multiply pre-existing stressors’ and ‘acts as a threat 
multiplier, which magnifies existing vulnerabilities’.82 This reveals the complexity of climate 
change-induced migration as a human rights problem, with causal factors involved that may not 
easily be linked with the acts and omissions of States. In this regard, it is worthwhile recalling that 
establishing causation is not necessarily required to prove the existence of a human rights 
violation. Illustrative is the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in in Tatar C. Roumanie, 
finding that ‘even in the absence of scientific probability about a causal link, the existence of a 
serious and substantial risk to health and well-being’ of the applicants imposed on the State ‘a 
positive obligation to adopt adequate measures capable of protecting the rights of the applicants 
to respect for their private and family life and, more generally, to the enjoyment of a healthy and 
protected environment’.83 It is clear from this judgment, which reflects the general law of State 
responsibility,84 that a failure to act in accordance with a positive obligation will be attributed to 
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the State and trigger the State’s responsibility if the State was bound by the obligation. It will not 
be necessary to link the omission to a specific organ or agent.85 
 
The unwillingness of human rights bodies to recognise either territorial boundaries or causation as 
automatic shields against State responsibility seems evident. Accordingly, the precise limits on 
States’ discretion need urgent clarification. As this article has demonstrated, there is a specific 
need for (quasi-) judicial interpretation of States’ obligations in the context of climate change-
induced damage to human beings and traditional cultures. Human rights bodies might be able to 
offer such interpretations at their own initiative or, when confronted with petitions, on a case-by-
case basis in light of the specific facts of one case. In the view of the present author, a proactive 
stance of human rights bodes would be preferable given the strenuousness of the task of 
interpreting obligations that are essentially about solving a problem that involves the international 
community as a whole. Ex post facto litigation might serve to provide victims with a remedy, but is 
highly unlikely to offer the clarification of States’ obligations that is needed to make international 
human rights law better equipped to inform climate change-related State action, including in the 
area of migration.  
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
This article has purported to show that States’ obligations under international human rights law 
towards climate migrants potentially stretch much further than a mere obligation to allow 
individual migrants basic refugee-type protection. And although this protection may, in some 
cases, be a precondition for enjoyment of Article 27 rights within the territory of a host State, the 
added value of these rights is that it creates obligations to prevent and remedy forced migration. 
More specifically, traditional economies and cultures need to be protected against adverse effects 
of climate change through positive State action by virtue of States’ existing obligations under 
Articles 27 and 1. These provisions also require that cultural minorities and peoples be consulted 
about measures that might interfere with these traditional economies. However, the 
operationalisation of these requirements might be hampered by lack of insight into their meaning 
and scope in the context of climate change. The requirement nonetheless flows from treaty 
obligations and could thus, based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda, give rise to the 
international responsibility of a State that fails to meet it.86 In accordance with the general law of 
State responsibility, the violating State would incur addition obligations to cease the 
internationally wrongful act and make full reparations for injury caused by the act.87 The 
responsibility of States for human rights violations could be invoked by one or several States 
against one or several others, or by individuals through international human rights bodies.88 This is 
important considering that a State where minorities or peoples reside presumably has a right, and 
perhaps an obligation, to assert and defend the rights of these people(s) rather than, as Dinah 
Shelton puts it, ‘remaining passive and ultimately defending itself for alleged rights-violating acts 
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and omissions’.89 Human rights bodies or courts could take account of these obligations when 
confronted with claims submitted on behalf of climate migrants that invoke Articles 27 and 1 of 
the ICCPR.  
 
The invocation State responsibility (or any form of legal liability) for consequences of climate 
change comes however with its own legal and practical obstacles.90 In relation to the ICCPR, these 
obstacles include the above-mentioned ambiguity about substantive legal obligations, including 
about the content of obligations owed by third States towards members of minorities who are 
forced to flee from the impacts of climate change. Moreover, questions arise with regard to the 
type of evidence, including scientific evidence, which might be needed to establish wrongfulness 
of climate change-related acts attributable to States. Possible answers to these questions could 
give rise to radically different conclusions about State responsibility, ranging from a scenario 
where no State is legally responsible for adverse effects of climate change that affect human 
beings to one where virtually every State is responsible for such effects. One would hope that 
human rights bodies confronted with these questions would find nuanced answers, perhaps 
through taking account of the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’ in determining the content of human rights obligations of each State.91 This 
would enable interpretations of obligations in line with States’ historical contributions to climate 
change and their capacity to realise not only the rights of their own people but also rights of non-
nationals abroad. International human rights scholarship could be instrumental in understanding 
how this part of international human rights law could be meaningfully invoked to deal with climate 
change-induced migration, including in the context of international climate change negotiations 
and international cooperation.  
 
   
  
 
  
                                                  
89
 Shelton 91.  
90
 On State responsibility for climate change generally, see Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International 
Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005); Christina Voigt, ‘State Responsibility 
for Climate Change Damages’ (2008) 77 Nordic Journal of International Law 1 22 and Christian Tomuschat, ‘Global 
Warming and State Responsibility’ in Holger Hestermeyer and others (eds), Law of the Sea in Dialogue (Springer 2011) 
18-22. 
91
 I have elaborated this possibility elsewhere. See Margreet Wewerinke, ‘Climate Change: Human Rights Committee, 
Ad-Hoc Conciliation Commission’ in Mark Gibney and Wouter Vandenhole (eds), Litigating Transnational Human Rights 
Obligations: Alternative Judgments (Routledge 2013). 
  
  
 Centre of Governance and Human Rights 
 POLIS · 7 West Road · Cambridge · CB3 9DT · United Kingdom 
 www.polis.cam.ac.uk/cghr 
                 
 
 Centre of Governance and Human Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citation: Wewerinke, M., (December 2013) ‘A Right to Enjoy Culture in Face of Climate Change: 
Implications for “Climate Migrants”’, CGHR Working Paper 6 | 4CMR Working Paper 7, Cambridge: 
University of Cambridge Centre of Governance and Human Rights / Cambridge Centre for Climate 
Change Mitigation Research 
  
   Copyright: Margaretha Wewerinke, 2013 
You are free: 
to copy, distribute, display, and perform the work 
to make derivative works 
 
Under the following conditions: 
Attribution — You must give the original author credit.  
Non-Commercial — You may not use this work for commercial purposes.  
Share Alike — If you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work 
only under a licence identical to this one.  
Please see full details of this license here: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/    
